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Blockchain Disruption: Digital Assets Are
Changing How We Do Business
Nick Curley*
ABSTRACT
Digital assets are changing the way businesses think about equity, labor,
business models, and business organization. Digital assets, like Bitcoin or
Ethereum, provide incredible opportunities to further align shareholders with
the objectives of the entity.
Each time humanity advances its technology for ledgers, markets explode, and we witness immense wealth creation. Digital assets like Bitcoin
and Ethereum are the next great step forward for ledger technology.
While there are incredible opportunities to leverage this new technology, there are also incredible risks. There are many public examples of
“hacks” of prominent blockchains like Ethereum and Solana. Blockchain
technology has captured the imagination of the public. Blockchain, therefore,
must develop a robust security system and intelligently distribute and limit
liability for institutional and retail investors to reap the rewards of public
attention.
Part of the risk that comes from digital assets is its newness.
Blockchains that run smart contracts have many incredible uses that could
eliminate middlemen in many industries. But courts are yet to develop case
law surrounding smart contracts. The way that smart contracts self-execute
presents a new question which courts must address: how should a court allocate risk between two smart-contracting parties?
No matter how the courts decide, the market needs an answer. This article attempts to explore some of the opportunities in digital assets and how
these opportunities are fundamentally different from their traditional
equivalents.
I.

INTRODUCTION

What if Marriot could offer discounted hotel rooms to investors with
over $100,000 worth of Marriot stock, VIP Lounge Access to investors who
held Marriot stock for at least ten years, or free meals at Marriot properties to
investors who referred a friend to invest? The blockchain and digitization of
ownership will allow entities to engage in various manners of new and exciting incentives.1 Digitization will bring ownership and the underlying asset
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1.

See BAXTER HINES, DIGITAL FINANCE, SECURITY TOKENS AND UNLOCKING THE
REAL POTENTIAL OF BLOCKCHAIN 63 (2020).
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closer together than ever before.2 Plus, ownership transfer through the
blockchain is cheaper, more secure, and faster than any Wall Street
transaction.3
In March of 2022, Bitcoin’s market cap surpassed the Russian Ruble to
make it a “top 15 currency” in the world.4 Solidifying this position,
“[i]nstitutional investments in digital assets” surged throughout 2021.5 The
discussion in the blockchain community has shifted from how to attract institutional investment to how to build infrastructure to retain institutional investment.6 Protecting this institutional money on the blockchain will require
a massive and coordinated effort from cybersecurity engineers, financial
coordinators, and lawyers.7
Cryptocurrency is an encrypted and decentralized currency that internet
users can exchange, much like ordinary currency, for services and items.8
Encryption is the “technical processes of converting plaintext into
ciphertext.”9 While “decentralization refers to the transfer of control and decision-making from a centralized entity . . . to a distributed network.”10
In 1989, Tim Berners-Lee, a scientist at CERN, invented the World
Wide Web as a tool for “automated information-sharing between scientists in
universities and institutes around the world.”11 The first era of the internet,

2.

Id.

3.

Id.

4.

Oluwapelumi Adejumo, Bitcoin is now a top 15 currency as it surpasses Russian Ruble, CRYPTOSLATE (Mar. 1, 2022, 9:11 PM), https://cryptoslate.com/
bitcoin-is-now-a-top-15-currency-as-it-surpasses-russian-ruble/ [https://
perma.cc/WYD6-KSC3].

5.

Building a Secure Crypto Infrastructure for Institutional Investors, COINDESK
(Dec. 22, 2021, 8:54 AM), https://www.coindesk.com/sponsored-content/build
ing-a-secure-crypto-infrastructure-for-institutional-investors/ [https://perma.cc/
C9CQ-XKVA].

6.

Id.

7.

See id.

8.

Kate Ashford & John Schmidt, What Is Cryptocurrency?, FORBES (Jan. 25,
2022, 4:15 PM), https://www.forbes.com/advisor/investing/what-is-cryptocurrency/ [https://perma.cc/W6V5-4F9T].

9.

Cryptopedia Staff, What Is Encryption? A Brief Overview, GEMINI (Apr. 20,
2021), https://www.gemini.com/cryptopedia/what-is-encryption-blockchainsymmetric-asymmetric [https://perma.cc/C9CQ-XKVA].

10.

What is Decentralization in Blockchain?, AMAZON, https://aws.amazon.com/
blockchain/decentralization-in-blockchain/ [https://perma.cc/9UJB-N623].

11.

The birth of the Web, CERN, https://home.cern/science/computing/birth-web
[https://perma.cc/XM75-2EM8].
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Web 1.0, consisted of static pages with few content creators.12 The second
era of the internet, Web 2.0, is the internet of today, where companies “provide services in exchange for your personal data.”13 The third era of the internet, Web 3.0 (Web3), is the internet of tomorrow, where developers create
decentralized applications (dApps) which run on the blockchain.14
During the COVID-19 pandemic, Web3 inundated the zeitgeist of finance. While cryptocurrencies captured the public’s attention in 2021, it is
blockchain’s financial instruments and organizations that will catalyze the
adoption of Web3: (1) Smart contracts will replace financial services like
escrow, insurance, and underwriting; (2) Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) will create new business opportunities for historically disenfranchised groups while disrupting long standing legal principles of business
entity law; and (3) crypto-lending and staking will shift the distribution of
capital with attractive interest rates. In total this comment will explore a limited number of Web3 disruptions to traditional financial entities and
transactions.
II.
A.

HISTORY OF BLOCKCHAIN FINANCE

A Brief Overview of Currency and Wealth from Cattle to Crypto

Before civilization had liquid currency to facilitate trade, many cultures
bartered for items. One of the earliest forms of currency was Cattle.15 In fact,
a Mesopotamian named Nanni penned the earliest recorded customer complaint nearly 4,000 years ago.16 Upset over a copper ingot shipment’s quality,
Nanni wrote to the merchant Ea-nasir that from now on, Nanni would “exercise against [Ea-nasir his] right of rejection.”17
In the time since Cattle exchanged hands directly, currency has evolved
into a complex web of actors attempting to influence the market. Currently,
the United States operates on a fiat currency system.18 “[F]iat currency—
12. Madhurkant Sharma, Web 1.0, Web2.0 and Web 3.0 with their difference,
GEEKSFORGEEKS (Jan. 27, 2022), https://www.geeksforgeeks.org/web-1-0web-2-0-and-web-3-0-with-their-difference/ [https://perma.cc/VP67-5YZ2].
13.

WEB2 VS WEB3, ETHEREUM, https://ethereum.org/en/developers/docs/web2vs-web3/ [https://perma.cc/E7Z9-8Q32].

14.

See id.

15.

The History of Money, PBS (Oct. 25, 1996), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/
article/history-money/ [https://perma.cc/XBE7-6FL7].

16.

See Clay Tablet Containing Letter from Ea-nasir to Nanni, (1750 B.C.)
ARCHAEOLOGICAL INST. AM., (May/June 2016), https://www.archaeology.org/
issues/213-1605/features/4368-cuneiform-letters [https://perma.cc/YDC6QC54].

17.

Id.

18.

See Fiat v. Virtual Currency, TEXAS STATE SEC. BD., https://www.ssb.texas.
gov/fiat-v-virtual-currency [https://perma.cc/K6JN-H7AW].
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such as dollars, euros, pounds, or yen—is a trusted medium of exchange, or
legal tender, that is issued by a recognized government authority.”19 One of
the primary benefits to virtual currencies is that they cut out intermediaries.20
Instead they engage in peer-to-peer transactions which the blockchain can
verify.21 This verification system requires no trust between users.22
Blockchain’s disruptive potential makes financial intermediaries and government regulators nervous.23 For instance, the Texas State Securities Board
touts that virtual currencies are not legal tender, are unregulated, and have no
consumer protections.24 But in 2021, El Salvador became the first country to
recognize Bitcoin as legal tender.25
When a person or entity plans to create a cryptocurrency, they will release a “white paper.” A “white paper” outlines the “purpose and the technology behind” the cryptocurrency.26 On April 23, 2011, Satoshi Nakamoto
released the Bitcoin white paper in an email saying, “I’ve moved on to other
things.”27 Following this cryptic email, no one has ever seen or heard from
Nakamoto, and their identity remains in much dispute.28 The Bitcoin “white
paper,” however, set out the plan for “the first functional digital currency
powered by a distributed ledger technology called blockchain.”29
B.

Society Improves Each Time It Enhances Its Ledgers

Having a reliable way to record information about parties and their relationships allows for a more sophisticated web of relationships between parties with no prior relationships. “A ledger is a book containing accounts to
19.

Id.

20.

See id.

21.

Id.

22.

Id.

23.

Fiat, supra note 18.

24.

Id.

25. Joe Hernandez, El Salvador Just Became the First Country to Accept Bitcoin as
Legal Tender, NPR (Sept. 7, 2021, 4:57 PM), https://www.npr.org/2021/09/07/
1034838909/bitcoin-el-salvador-legal-tender-official-currency-cryptocurrency
[https://perma.cc/3RFW-6WJY].
26.

What’s a Whitepaper in Cryptocurrency? What’s Its Purpose?, NDTV (Oct. 1,
2021, 6:30 AM), https://www.ndtv.com/business/what-are-whitepapers-in-theworld-of-cryptocurrency-2556831#:~:text=What%20is%20a%20whitepaper%
3F,and%20other%20data%20about%20cryptocurrency [https://perma.cc/
MRP8-DCVK].

27. Ollie Leech, Bitcoin White Paper Celebrates 13th Birthday, COINDESK (Jan.
21, 2021, 1:22 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/tech/2021/01/21/what-is-thebitcoin-white-paper/ [https://perma.cc/PD35-XG4H].
28.

Id.

29.

Id.
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which debits and credits are posted from books of original entry.”30 Each
time a new form of ledger emerges, society takes an incredible leap forward.31 Mesopotamian Cuneiform allowed recordkeeping to show the quantities of barley meal and malt needed to make types of beers.32 The notion of
balancing an entity’s accounts through double-entry bookkeeping was first
recorded in 1494 by Luca Pacioli, the “Father of Accounting.”33 Werner
Sombart, a Marxist economist, remarked that “capital, as a category, did not
exist before double-entry bookkeeping.”34 Next banks began to use money in
ledgers rather than measuring “a quantity of something tangible owned or
owed.”35 So “[h]umanity’s primal motivation to gather wealth was redirected
away from real goods to ledger numbers on paper and electronic
databases.”36 The next leap forward is the distributed ledger.
C.

Ethereum Demonstrates the Vast Potential and Danger of
Distributed Ledgers

One such blockchain is the Ethereum network. Ethereum’s model of
decentralization means that “[a]nyone who is on the network has permission
to use the service.”37 Users and services cannot block each other or “deny . . .
access to the service.”38 And “[p]ayments are built in” through the Ethereum
currency.39
In 2016, investors started a Decentralized Autonomous Organization
(DAO) with the intent “to act as an investor-directed venture capital firm.”40
The DAO raised approximately $150 million USD worth of Ethereum’s na30.

Ledger, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
ledger [https://perma.cc/9ZB6-VTVL].

31.

See LLFOURN, A Brief History of Ledgers, MEDIUM (Feb. 15, 2018) https://
medium.com/unraveling-the-ouroboros/a-brief-history-of-ledgersb6ab84a7ff41 [https://perma.cc/MP4G-YLCX].

32.

See id.

33.

Double Entry, CORP. FIN. INST., https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/accounting/double-entry/ [https://perma.cc/RBX7-4FX2].

34. LLFOURN, supra note 31; See Bruce G. Carruthers & Wendy Nelson Espeland, Accounting for Rationality: Double-Entry Bookkeeping and the Rhetoric
of Economic Rationality, 97 AM. J. SOCIO. 31, 33 (Jul. 1991).
35. LLFOURN, supra note 31.
36.

Id.

37.

ETHEREUM, supra note 13.

38.

Id.

39.

Id.

40. Cryptopedia Staff, What Was The DAO?, GEMINI (Mar. 16, 2022), https://
www.gemini.com/cryptopedia/the-dao-hack-makerdao#section-what-is-a-dao
[https://perma.cc/GEB8-4CZY].
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tive coin, ETH, from more than 11,000 investors.41 But hackers then exploited a vulnerability in the DAO’s computer code.42 Ultimately, it lost
around $60 million worth of ETH.43 Someone claiming to be the attacker
“published an open letter to the Ethereum community that claimed the funds
had been obtained in a ‘legal’ way in accordance with the rules set out in the
smart contract.”44 To “return the money to its original owners, Ethereum core
developers chose to implement a hard fork.”45
So, then there were two Ethereum blockchains. Ethereum Classic chose
not to erase the theft, instead supporting “[a] truly immutable blockchain
with a permanent record of the network’s entire history, including a successful cybertheft.”46 Ethereum chose to revise the blockchain to erase the theft.47
The “proponents of Ethereum Classic argue that the [Ethereum] hard fork
hypocritically enabled the very thing that blockchain technology is meant to
prevent—subjective human manipulation.”48 The blockchain is engaging in a
conversation as to the value of equity in parallel to the legal field’s recent
evaluations of equity, which can be distilled to whether society should privilege “the ex ante perspective of the parties intent at the time of [a contract’s]
formation,” or “the ex post perspective of justice and fairness to the parties at
the time of adjudication.”49
The blockchain penetrates other social decisions, too, such as environmentalism. Bitcoin miners opened a bitcoin mine on top of “the last working
coal plant in the state of New York.”50 The plant, northeast of Niagara falls,
is “ripe for Bitcoin mining” because of “its cheap hydroelectric power and
abundance of shuttered power plants” which “often [have] existing connections to the power grid.”51 While embodying the spirit of recycling, these
41.

Id.

42.

Id.

43.

Id.

44.

Id.

45. Cryptopedia Staff, Ethereum Classic (ETC): A Rift in the Blockchain Community, GEMINI (Dec. 3, 2021), https://www.gemini.com/cryptopedia/ethereumclassic-etc-vs-eth#section-ethereum-vs-ethereum-classic [https://perma.cc/
4XLM-GM2C].
46.

Id.

47.

Id.

48.

Id.

49.

Compare id., with Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, The Case Against Equity in
American Contract Law, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1327 (2020).

50. Corey Kilgannon, A Bitcoin Boom Fueled by Cheap Power, Empty Plants and
Few Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2021), https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/
markets/cryptocurrency/a-bitcoin-boom-fueled-by-cheap-power-empty-plantsand-few-rules/articleshow/88118672.cms [https://perma.cc/D4RD-KCFT].
51.

Id.
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mines “[g]lobally . . . consume more electricity annually than all of Argentina.”52 China, a historically massive holder of bitcoin mines, “banned
[bitcoin mining] this year to help achieve [China’s] carbon-reduction
goals.”53
Further, the mainstream adoption of blockchain technology and
cryptocurrencies could lead to further income inequality.54 Bitcoin’s massive
increase in price created new mines. mines.55 Wealthy investors “increasingly [view] cryptocurrencies the way they see other high-risk assets, like
private equity shares and venture capital.”56 This increase in price, including
the high barriers to entry for some cryptocurrencies, could lead to the continued exclusion of persons previously excluded by traditional finance.57
Additionally, miners use Graphics Processing Units (GPUs) to mine
cryptocurrencies which has caused a shortage of GPUs in the market.58 While
the GeForce RTX 3060 Ti GPU sells for $400, the average price on eBay for
that GPU in November of 2021 was $946.59 Because most users can only
purchase a GPU on the secondary market, blockchain mining becomes increasingly inaccessible to the poor.60
However, some commentators note “that cryptocurrencies can contribute positively to reduce the global imbalance of income and wealth distribu52.

Id.

53.

Id.

54. Ashish Rajendra Sai et al., Characterizing Wealth Inequality in Cryptocurrencies, FRONTIERS IN (Dec. 20, 2021), https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/
10.3389/fbloc.2021.730122/full#h7 [https://perma.cc/823J-6K2E].
55.

See Megan DeMatteo, Bitcoin Doubled Its Value in 2021, Then Lost It All in
the First Month of 2022. Here’s a Look at Its Price Over the Years, TIME
NEXTADVISOR (Jan. 28 2022), https://time.com/nextadvisor/investing/
cryptocurrency/bitcoin-price-history/ [https://perma.cc/F35S-6PD6].

56. Paul Sullivan, As Bitcoin’s Price Surges, Affluent Investors Start to Take a
Look, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/29/yourmoney/bitcoin-wealth-investors.html [https://perma.cc/H3UX-6GES].
57.

See Sai et al., supra note 54.

58. Griffin Davis, Nvidia, AMD Cryptomining To Continue Until 2022 — How
Can ETH Help GPU Shortage?, TECH TIMES (Oct. 26, 2021, 1:10 PM), https://
www.techtimes.com/articles/267141/20211026/nvidia-amd-cryptomining-continue-until-2022-ethereum-help-gpu-shortage.htm [https://perma.cc/CBU5Z29Z].
59. Tim Schiesser, GPU Availability and Pricing Update: November 2021 Will
GPU Pricing Ever Go Down?, TECHSPOT (Nov. 19, 2021), https://www.techspot.com/article/2369-gpu-pricing-2021-update/#:~:text=Nvidia%20GPUs%
20saw%20an%20average,3070%20which%20rose%20by%204%
25.&text=despite%20these%20price%20increases%2C%20Nvidia,we’ve%
20seen%20in%202021 [https://perma.cc/5CCW-4QKG].
60.

Id.
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tion.”61 The blockchain’s ability to fight inequality rests on its ability to
include previously excluded groups.62 Researchers use the Gini coefficient to
measure income inequality in populations.63 A Gini value of zero “indicates a
perfectly equal distribution of income or wealth within a population,” while
“[a value] of one represents a perfect inequality when one person in a population receives all the income.”64 In 2021, researchers measured the Gini value
of Bitcoin at .65, which is comparatively close to Australia’s Gini score.65
Dogecoin held “the highest observed Gini” value of .82, which is just under
the United States score of .85.66 However, the blockchain’s observable level
of inequality could merely be the result of our current economic system
adopting these cryptocurrencies.67
The blockchain has already inherited some of the vices of the traditional
market like day trading.68 Day traders trade “one or more securities throughout the day to turn a profit, [w]hile traditional buy-and-hold investors are
concerned with the long-term performance of a company.”69 The United
States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) does not consider day
trading to be illegal, but it acknowledges the extreme risk it poses to unsophisticated parties.70 The SEC warns that “[m]ost individual investors do not
have the wealth, the time, or the temperament to make money and to sustain
the devastating losses that day trading can bring”71 Yet, popular news sites
push articles with headlines like 5 Strategies to Start Day Trading Crypto72

61. Sai et al., supra note 54.
62.

See id.

63.

Gini Coefficient, CORP. FIN. INST., https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/economics/gini-coefficient/ [https://perma.cc/3E78-DTBS].

64.

Id.

65. Sai et al., supra note 54.
66.

Id.

67.

See id.

68. Ryan Austin, 5 Strategies to Start Day Trading Crypto, BUSINESS INSIDER
(Nov. 10, 2021, 9:05 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/day-tradingcrypto [https://perma.cc/2XRU-G53U].
69.

Id.

70.

Day Trading: Your Dollars at Risk, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Apr. 20,
2005), https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/investor-publications/investorpubsday
tipshtm.html#:~:text=While%20day%20trading%20is%20neither,that%
20day%20trading%20can%20bring [https://perma.cc/8H5U-GABK].

71.

Id.

72. Austin, supra note 68.

2022]

Blockchain Disruption

273

and How to Make $100 a Day Trading Crypto.73 The market peddles high
risk equity positions to the average consumer because GPU prices remain too
high for entry.74 This cycle unfairly allocates the risk of ownership to those
least able to handle its consequences. As a result, inequality will probably
continue on the blockchain as it always did in traditional finance.
III.

SMART CONTRACTS MAKE TRADITIONAL FINANCIAL
SERVICES MORE EFFICIENT AND AFFORDABLE.

Essentially, smart contracts are codified business rules.75 Smart contracts are “code that does what it’s been programmed to do. If the business
rules . . . have been defined [poorly] . . . the result is going to be a mess”
which auto-executes.76 Ordinary contracts merely suffer inartful drafting, but
smart contracts suffer both inartful drafting and coding.77 The Stacks Foundation lists eight serious vulnerabilities to smart contracts which Clarity,78 “a
smart contract language that [purportedly] optimizes for predictability and
security,” may fix.79
To add another layer of unpredictability, courts are yet to address pressing issues about smart contracts.80 Because “the use of smart contracts is in
its incipient stages, there is no case law precedent that directly addresses the
enforceability of smart contracts and . . . there are only a handful of state
statutes purporting to address this issue directly.”81 Setting aside any potential problems with the unlicensed practice of law for programmers, lawyers
have a duty of competence under the ABA’s Model Rules for Professional
Responsibility which provides “[a] lawyer shall provide competent represen73. Gal Mux, How to Make $100 a Day Trading Crypto, MEDIUM (Nov. 1, 2021),
https://medium.com/geekculture/how-to-make-100-a-day-trading-cryptoca93a3054b89 [https://perma.cc/K5S7-AGUX].
74.

See id.

75. Lucas Mearian, What’s a Smart Contract (and How Does It Work)?, COMPUTERWORLD (Jul. 29, 2019, 3:00 AM), https://www.computerworld.com/article/3412140/whats-a-smart-contract-and-how-does-it-work.html [https://
perma.cc/9NVT-LBL8].
76.

Id.

77.

See id.

78. Jude Nelson, Bringing ‘Clarity’ to 8 Dangerous Smart Contract Vulnerabilities, STACKS FOUNDATION (Mar. 11, 2020), https://stacks.org/bringing-clarityto-8-dangerous-smart-contract-vulnerabilities/ [https://perma.cc/U6P8-832N].
79. Aaron Blankstein, Introducing Clarity, a Language For Predictable Smart
Contracts, BLOCKSTACK, https://blog.blockstack.org/introducing-clarity-thelanguage-for-predictable-smart-contracts/ [https://perma.cc/7FDU-B6RK].
80. Stuart Levi et al., BLOCKCHAIN & CRYPTOCURRENCY REGULATION 2020 156
(Jasias N. Dewey ed., 2d ed. 2020).
81.

Id.
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tation to a client.”82 “Competent representation requires the legal knowledge,
skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”83 The American Bar Association updated the comment to Rule 1.1
comment in 2012 to require that “a lawyer should keep abreast of changes in
the law and its practice, including the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology.”84 While artificial intelligence systems are helping draft legal documents;85 artificial intelligence cannot completely replace the
lawyer’s role in review any time soon.86 It is imperative that lawyers intending to work with smart contracts develop adequate technological and legal competency to work with these instruments.87
A.

How Smart Contracts Work

Programmers write smart contracts to execute after a condition is met.88
A blockchain will use nodes “to verify each batch of network transactions,
called blocks.”89 An individual can submit a transaction to a node in the
network.90 That node then “broadcasts [the transaction] to” the other nodes
on the network.91 Over time, every node processes the transaction using the
smart contract’s If/Then logic, and if the nodes come to a quorum over the
transaction, then the nodes update the blockchain.92 Further, no one may alter
a smart contract once the contract is in place, so getting it right the first time
82.

MODEL RULES

OF

PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).

83.

Id.

84.

MODEL RULES

OF

PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2012).

85.

See Lexi Soberanis, From Research to Contracts, AI Is Changing the Legal
Services Industry, IBM (Nov. 4, 2021), https://www.ibm.com/blogs/journey-toai/2021/11/from-research-to-contracts-ai-is-changing-the-legal-services-industry/ [https://perma.cc/WPE4-JSXF].

86. David Silbert, Contract AI: What It Is and What It Isn’t, DOCUSIGN (Jun. 8,
2021), https://www.docusign.com/blog/contract-ai [https://perma.cc/43DEMZH4].
87.

See id.

88.

What Are Smart Contracts On Blockchain?, IBM, https://www.ibm.com/topics/
smart-contracts [https://perma.cc/ZV8M-8AFE].

89.

What Is a Blockchain Node and How Is It Used in Cryptocurrency?, GADGETS360 (Aug. 21, 2021, 10:23 AM), https://gadgets.ndtv.com/cryptocurrency/
features/what-is-a-blockchain-node-how-does-cryptocurrency-work-2515427#:
~:text=A%20blockchain%20node’s%20main%20purpose,others%20by%20a%
20unique%20identifier [https://perma.cc/PZJ9-9MNS].

90. Jim Zhang, What Are Smart Contracts and How Do They Work?, KALEIDO
(Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.kaleido.io/blockchain-blog/what-are-smart-contracts-and-how-do-they-work [https://perma.cc/EA47-JR4X].
91.

Id.

92.

Id.
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is more important than ever.93 It is even possible to run an Ethereum node on
a Raspberry Pi;94 a “credit-card sized computer” capable of impressive functions like playing high-definition video and playing games.95
To run smart contracts based on the Ethereum blockchain, the Ethereum
Virtual Machine (EVM) “act[s] as a runtime environment.”96 Every “computation that happens in the EVM requires gas.”97 Gas is “a unit of measurement used to assign a fee to each transaction with a smart contract.”98 So
“[t]he more complex and tedious [the computation] is, the more gas is needed
to execute the smart contract.”99 Luckily users can view an estimate of gas
fees prior to executing their smart contract.100
IBM lists the advantages of smart contracts to include speed, trust, and
security.101 A smart contract is faster than an ordinary contract because
“[o]nce a condition is met, the contract is executed immediately.”102 But the
speed varies between each blockchain that supports smart contracts.103 The
speed of a blockchain is measured in transactions per second (TPS).104 The
TPS of Ethereum is “between 15 and 45,” while the TPS of a competing
blockchain, Solana, is “around 50,000.”105

93.

LEVI

ET AL.,

supra note 80 at 163.

94.

See Raphael Pralat, Start an Ethereum Node on a Raspberry Pi 4 with Geth,
MEDIUM (Aug. 19, 2019), https://raphaelpralat.medium.com/start-an-ethereumnode-on-a-raspberry-pi-4-with-geth-ba13d9f57ef8 [https://perma.cc/5U58VPZJ].

95.

What Is a Raspberry Pi?, RASPBERRYPI, https://www.raspberrypi.org/help/
what-%20is-a-raspberry-pi/ [https://perma.cc/67ZZ-JXX4].

96. Avadhoot Kulkarni, How to Write and Deploy Your First Smart Contract,
FREECODECAMP (May 18, 2018), https://www.freecodecamp.org/news/how-towrite-and-deploy-your-first-smart-contract-341d5e2ffb35/ [https://perma.cc/
4XR3-TBED].
97.

Id.

98.

Id.

99.

Id.

100. Id.
101. See IBM, supra note 88.
102. Id.
103. See What Is Solana? All You Need To Know About The Ethereum Killer Before
Investing, NDTV (Nov. 12, 2021), https://www.ndtv.com/business/what-is-solana-all-you-need-to-know-about-the-ethereum-killer-before-investing2605678#:~:text=3)%20Solana%20has%20great%20speed,15%20and%
2045%20TPS%20currently [https://perma.cc/86TE-5C6T].
104. Id.
105. Id.
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Smart contracts solve authenticity problems

The authenticity of documents and signatures in traditional contracts is a
highly litigious field. The blockchain, following adequate regulation from the
federal government, will have much less litigation as to the authenticity of
documents because “encrypted records of transactions are shared across”
every node in the system.106 In fact, “[d]igitization increases a regulator’s
ability to perform effective oversight” because of the blockchain’s increased
transparency.107 The blockchain can even help proactively enforce regulations because a digital asset can police itself and report every transaction to
regulators.108 Today, regulators mostly react to traditional finance transactions, but proactive regulators monitoring the blockchain will increase regulatory effectiveness.109
The authenticity of a transaction on the blockchain is confirmed by a
quorum of the nodes on the blockchain before the nodes execute the smart
contract.110 The security of a blockchain with proper incentives is supported
by evolutionary game theory.111 As opposed to classical game theory where
“the success of a strategy depends on the strategy itself,” evolutionary game
theory “is played multiple times among numerous players,” and “[t]he success of an individual strategy depends not only on the strategy itself but also
on the frequency distribution of alternative strategies and their successes.”112
If a blockchain penalizes validators much more than the incentive received
for being in a quorum, then game theory suggests that the validators “are
better off by acting honestly in an honest quorum than acting maliciously in a
malicious quorum.”113
C.

Hackers can exploit smart contracts

While proponents of smart contracts tout the security of the blockchain,
malicious attacks have plagued blockchains operating smart contracts.114 As
106. See IBM, supra note 88.
107. Hines, supra note 1 at 91.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. IBM, supra note 88.
111. Shashank Motepalli & Hans-Arno Jacobsen, REWARD MECHANISM FOR
BLOCKCHAINS USING EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY, 2021 3rd Conf. on
Blockchain Rsch.; Applications for Innovative Networks and Servs. (BRAINS)
217, 223 (2021) https://arxiv.org/pdf/2104.05849.pdf [https://perma.cc/2AB49BMY].
112. Id. at 218.
113. Id. at 222.
114. See Cryptopedia Staff, supra note 40.
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of the time of this writing, Solana has been brought down by 3 attacks.115
Following each of these attacks, it took Solana hours to become operational
again.116 One of the attacks forced the hard fork between Ethereum Classic
and Ethereum.117 As a result, the alleged attacker was able to claim the
money following the execution of those smart contracts as written.118
Rational minds disagreed over whether this was truly an attack and
whether the hard fork emerged.119 While the contract was executed due to the
fulfillment of a condition in the smart contract, the parties to the transaction
did not intend that transfer.120 At a minimum this raises the point that a lawyer should help draft smart contracts.121 The Ethereum hard fork should alert
the legal community to a serious need for intelligent drafting in Web3.122
These attacks mark a major vulnerability for blockchains—design is crucial
to capturing these benefits.
D.

Every smart contract probably qualifies for federal jurisdiction

Virtually every blockchain could qualify for federal jurisdiction under
the Interstate Commerce Clause.123 The nodes for a blockchain are bound to
be in more than one state, and likely, more than one country.124 For example,
every Ethereum transaction as of 2022 necessarily uses foreign hardware.125
Approximately forty-four percent of Ethereum nodes are in the United
States.126 But a block on Ethereum requires that the nodes reach a consensus
where at least sixty-six percent of nodes agree.127 So for Ethereum to reach a
115. Solana’s Network Goes Down For the Third Time in Less Than Six Months,
BUS. INSIDER INDIA BUREAU (Jan. 5, 2022, 10:29 AM), https://
www.businessinsider.in/cryptocurrency/news/ethereum-killer-solana-networkcrashes-for-third-time-in-six-months/articleshow/88703869.cms [https://
perma.cc/HRJ6-RXSC].
116. Id.
117. Cryptopedia Staff, supra note 45.
118. Id.
119. See id.
120. Id.
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
124. Ethereum Mainnet Statistics, ETHERNODES.ORG, https://ethernodes.org/countries [https://perma.cc/ZDU2-WQRV].
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Consensus Mechanisms, ETHEREUM (Jan. 29, 2022), https://ethereum.org/en/
developers/docs/consensus-mechanisms/ [https://perma.cc/3W88-XZJM].
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consensus on any block there is at least one node outside of the United
States.128
However, “[t]here is no federal contract law in the United States.”129
The elements to form a contract under the common law are “two or more
parties, each of whom is legally capable of being bound, a manifestation of
mutual assent, and consideration.”130 Similarly, “the UCC defines a contract
as ‘the total legal obligation that results from the parties’ agreement . . .’ and
an agreement as ‘the bargain of the parties in fact, as found in their language
or inferred from other circumstances.”131 A smart contract may result in a
legally enforceable contract if a court determines it meets the requirements of
the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) or the Second Restatement of Contracts.132 Importantly, parties must reduce some contracts to writing to satisfy
state statutes of frauds or additional formalities under the UCC.133 The UCC
defines “writing” to include “printing, typewriting, or any other intentional
reduction to tangible form.”134
The Uniform Law Commission published a guidance note in 2019 specifically addressing the applicability of the Uniform Electronic Transactions
Act (UETA) and ESIGN to blockchains.135 The federal Electronic Signatures
Recording Act (E-Sign Act) provides that a “signature, contract, or other
record relating to such transaction may not be denied legal effect, validity, or
enforceability solely because it is in electronic form.”136 UETA and E-Sign
“establish a legal framework for all electronic technologies through broad
definitions for electronic signatures and records and then basic provisions
assuring that they are on par with pen-and-ink for all legal purposes.”137
128. See ETHERNODES.ORG, supra note 124.
129. Stuart D. Levi & Alex B. Lipton, An Introduction to Smart Contracts and Their
Potential and Inherent Limitations, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE
(May 26, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/05/26/an-introductionto-smart-contracts-and-their-potential-and-inherent-limitations/#5 [https://
perma.cc/77PQ-JVRS].
130. Guidance Note Regarding the Relation Between the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act and Federal Esign Act, Blockchain Technology and “Smart Contracts”, UNIF. L. COMM’N (Jan. 2019), https://www.uniformlaws.org/
HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=D2026
984-1040-3c6f-62c8-a676b12d7bff&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/V8ZEBU9Z].
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Levi & Lipton, supra note 129.
134. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(43) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 1977).
135. See Uniform Law Commission, supra note 130 at 1.
136. 15 U.S.C. § 7001(a)(1).
137. Uniform Law Commission, supra note 130 at 5.
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UETA section 14 provides that “a contract ‘may be formed by the interaction
of electronic agents of the parties, even if no individual was aware of or
reviewed’ the operations of the agent or the terms and agreements.”138 Further, the E-Sign Act provides that “[a] contract . . . may not be denied legal
effect, validity, or enforceability solely because its formation . . . involved
the action of one or more electronic agents,” provided that the electronic
agent’s “action . . . is legally attributable to the person to be bound.”139 While
securities law is beyond the scope of this paper, legal commentators have
argued that “[c]ode-based, self-executing mechanisms arguably bring any
agreement that utilizes them within the UCC’s statutory parameters for security interests.”140
E.

Smart Contracts Are Already Replacing Traditional Financial
Instruments

While smart contracts come with a battery of problems, the potential
solutions that smart contracts promise could revolutionize how we deal with
all sorts of financial intermediaries and instruments. Developers on the
blockchain are using smart contracts to disrupt traditional financial solutions
like escrow, fiduciary duties, alternative dispute resolutions, insurance, and
financial instruments.141
1.

Escrow

Real estate law is a prime example of where a smart contract could
fundamentally change the apportionment of risk in escrow situations. In
2017, the co-founder of TechCrunch purchased an apartment in Kiev,
Ukraine, for $60,000 (around 212.5 ETH) using smart contracts on the Ethereum blockchain.142 Rather than using an escrow agent to handle the money
prior to closing, the buyer sent the funds to the address of a smart contract.143
After the buyer sent the money to the smart contract address, the buyer’s
138. Id. at 5–6 (citing UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 14 (UNIF. L. COMM’N
1999)).
139. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7001(h).
140. Heather Hughes, Blockchain and the Future of Secured Transactions Law,
STAN. J. BLOCKCHAIN L. & POL’Y (Jan. 5, 2020), https://stanfordjblp.pubpub.org/pub/blockchain-secured-transactions/release/1 [https://
perma.cc/K58N-H4HB].
141. Infra Section E(1)–(3) and accompanying text.
142. Anthony Cuthbertson, Blockchain Used to Sell Real Estate For the First Time,
NEWSWEEK (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.newsweek.com/blockchain-sell-realestate-first-time-ethereum-682982 [https://perma.cc/8PC2-UJYL].
143. Natalia Karayaneva, How a Smart Contract replaced An Escrow Company in a
$60k Deal, HACKERNOON (Oct. 17, 2017), https://hackernoon.com/how-asmart-contract-replaced-an-escrow-company-in-a-60k-deal-551ff7839044
[https://perma.cc/22RP-9EX4].
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agent, with power of attorney, signed the final document in front of a notary.144 The notary then sent the deal details and the smart contract address to
the National Property Registry to finish the deal.145
Blockchain users could repeat this transaction elsewhere using a 4 part
process: (1) either the buyer or seller deploys the smart contract and specifies
the settlement procedure and conditions of the smart contract; (2) the buyer
then sends a digital asset to the escrow smart contract; (3) if a specified
condition is met within the allotted time period, then the fulfilment is reported to the smart contract; and (4) the escrow smart contract ensures fulfilment of each condition and then releases the buyer’s digital asset to the
seller.146 If the escrow smart contract is not informed of the fulfillment of the
conditions or the condition was not satisfied pursuant to the agreement, then
the tokens are refunded to the buyer.147 Escrow smart contracts eliminate the
danger that either the escrow agent steals the money or the escrow agent
delivers the deed before receiving the money.148
A potential hiccup under Texas law is whether an escrow smart contract
can serve as an escrow agent.149 “An escrow agent acts as a neutral party to
the transaction and owes a fiduciary duty to both parties.”150 So can a smart
contract “ac[t] as a neutral party to the transaction and ow[e] a fiduciary duty
to both parties?”151
Drafters may require a smart contract to make an objective evaluation or
to rely on the objective evaluation of agreed upon third parties.152 In both
instances it is the programmer who should hold fiduciary responsibility.153
Where a smart contract makes an objective evaluation as to a condition’s
fulfillment—e.g. the smart contract verifies that a buyer has deposited a specific number of tokens into the smart contract’s address—the fiduciary duty
should lay with the programmer to code the smart contract according to the
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Escrow, CSIRO, https://research.csiro.au/blockchainpatterns/general-patterns/
blockchain-payment-patterns/escrow-2/ [https://perma.cc/FCT6-Q7R4].
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See generally Capcor at KirbyMain v. Moody Nat. Kirby Houston S, 509
S.W.3d 379, 384–87 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st] 2014).
150. Id. at 385.
151. Id.
152. See generally Mimi Zou et al., In Code We Trust? Trustlessness and Smart
Contracts, SCL (Apr. 4, 2019, 11:00 AM), https://www.scl.org/articles/10493in-code-we-trust-trustlessness-and-smart-contracts [https://perma.cc/HZ9FYAR6].
153. See id.
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specifications of the parties.154 A programmer’s failure to adhere to party
instructions should qualify as a breach of their fiduciary duty. Courts should
only hold programmers responsible for deviations from clear instructions, but
programmers should not be held responsible for unclear instructions from the
parties. For example, the attack on the DAO exploited a smart contract as
written.155 The failure was in the design of the conditions, not the programming itself.156
Where a smart contract relies on a representation by a third party
outside the blockchain—like where a condition to the smart contract is that
the low temperature in Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan, is above freezing on October 31—the fiduciary duty should still lay with the programmer. In this
second situation, the smart contract uses an oracle (an API) to communicate
with parties off the blockchain.157 Here the oracle will look to a designated
source of information, perhaps the website of a local meteorologist in Michigan, and if the data from that source satisfies the condition of the smart contract, then the contract will execute. Where parties agree upon a source, the
only risk is that the program does not execute correctly.
In both scenarios it is the programmer that should serve as the fiduciary
of the deal. A programmer, however, should never be held responsible for
poor contract design. This is another reason why involving a trained lawyer
and programmer to handle the separate tasks of legal drafting and computer
drafting is a good idea. Where a lawyer and programmer are involved in a
smart contract, a court can appropriately apportion liability.
2.

Smart Contracts help facilitate alternative dispute resolutions

The on and off nature of smart contracts does not leave much room for
the nuance of contract interpretation. A new trend in the world of Alternative
Dispute Resolutions is to use a Decentralized Dispute Resolution.158 Kleros
Escrow is a dApp “that can be used for any exchange of goods, assets, or
services involving an Ethereum-based asset.”159 Kleros allows users to create
a transaction on its platform.160 If parties dispute a transaction, “they can

154. See generally id.
155. Cryptopedia Staff, supra note 40.
156. See id.
157. See Oracles, ETHEREUM (Jan. 3, 2022), https://ethereum.org/en/developers/
docs/oracles/ [https://perma.cc/VCK9-HJMG].
158. See generally Escrow, KLEROS, https://kleros.io/en/escrow/ [https://perma.cc/
2CX5-VU2J].
159. Kleros Escrow Tutorial, KLEROS, https://kleros.gitbook.io/docs/products/es
crow/new-in-progress-kleros-escrow-tutorial [https://perma.cc/6YGH-Y5LG].
160. Kleros Escrow Specifications, KLEROS, https://kleros.gitbook.io/docs/products/
escrow/kleros-escrow-specifications [https://perma.cc/YG9K-F2JZ].
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create a dispute in Kleros court.”161 There are three possible outcomes to a
dispute involving an exchange of cryptocurrency: (1) the transaction’s sender
wins all the locked funds and Kleros reimburses their arbitration fees; (2) the
transaction’s receiver wins all the locked funds and Kleros reimburses their
arbitrations fees; or (3) Kleros splits the fees and locked funds evenly between the parties.162
Kleros selects arbitrators from a global pool.163 The system uses a native
token called “Pinakions” (PNK) to incentivize honest juror participation.164
While PNK is an innovative solution to the incentive problem that plagues
blockchain technology, it creates a questionable incentive structure for legal
arbitration. Kleros admits there is no specific way to ensure that jurors reviewed any evidence.165 Rather, they purely rely on an incentive system.166
Kleros requires jurors to deposit PNK to have a chance to be selected in the
global pool.167 Jurors self-select into different courts under Kleros by topic.168
Jurors stake coins by placing them with Kleros.169 An “incoherent” juror’s
vote disagrees with the ultimate ruling.170 If jurors render an “incoherent”
opinion they must pay part of their stake to the coherent jurors.171 The arbitration fees are divided among only the coherent jurors.172 This incentive
structure encourages jurors to agree with each other, not to fairly arbitrate.173
So on the blockchain, the twelve angry men become the twelve coherent
men.

161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See generally Kleros Juror Tutorial, KLEROS, https://kleros.gitbook.io/docs/
products/court/kleros-juror-tutorial [https://perma.cc/J2MN-E2UH].
164. Clément Lesaege et al., Kleros Short Paper v1.0.7, KLEROS (Sep. 2019), https:/
/kleros.io/static/whitepaper_en-8bd3a0480b45c39899787e17049ded26.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FP76-EX52].
165. Kleros FAQ, KLEROS,
perma.cc/WGL3-5HEY].

https://kleros.gitbook.io/docs/kleros-faq

[https://

166. Id.
167. Lesaege et al., supra note 164.
168. Id. (Topics include freelancing, package delivery, international deliveries, air
transport, sea transport, land transport, car insurance, house insurance, and
commercial insurance.)
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Lesaege et al., supra note 164.
173. See id.
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Kleros allows parties to appeal the result of any decision to its own
appellate system.174 Kleros defends its platform as a voluntary system,
“meaning the enforcement is automatic and pre-accepted by contracting parties agreeing on using Kleros as an arbitrator.”175 The contractual view of
Kleros stands in stark contrast to the Kleros white paper which proposes to
create “a multipurpose court system able to solve every kind of dispute.”176
Kleros makes an interesting statement that this serves as “a self-enforceable
arbitration method.”177 However, the enforceability of a Kleros decision is
beyond the scope of this article.
3. Insurance
Traditional insurance “relies on a trusted intermediary to execute [a]
transaction.”178 Intermediaries add time and cost to any system, but especially insurance.179 Using a smart contract to automate an insurance claim
provides transparency for both parties, speeds up the claims process, reduces
administrative costs, and preserves the agreement in a secure blockchain.180
But smart contracts today follow the “if X, then Y” formula, which fails to
capture the complexity of many insurance agreements.181
For example, if a party denies the enforceability of a contract, normally
that party can withhold payments before a court settles the matter. But a
smart contract will transfer the funds instantaneously. This forces courts to
make decisions after the transaction has been completed. This is a major
complication to the insurance industry. Inversely, the cost of challenging an
insurance denial in court is prohibitively expensive.
One possible solution is to use smart contracts with “parametric insurance.”182 Parametric insurance bases claims off of “clearly defined event[s]
174. Kleros FAQ, supra note 165.
175. Id.
176. Lesaege et al., supra note 164.
177. Dmitry Narozhny, Is Kleros Legally Valid as Arbitration?, KLEROS (Jun. 12,
2019), https://blog.kleros.io/is-kleros-legally-valid-as-arbitration/ [https://
perma.cc/4UB2-9443].
178. Ivan Kot, Smart Contracts in Insurance, INS. THOUGHT LEADERSHIP (Dec. 1,
2020), https://www.insurancethoughtleadership.com/blockchain/smart-contracts-insurance [https://perma.cc/R5X6-FBMR].
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Adelyn Zhou, How Blockchain Smart Contracts Are Reinventing the Insurance
Industry, NASDAQ (Jan. 29, 2021, 10:53 AM), https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/how-blockchain-smart-contracts-are-reinventing-the-insurance-industry2021-01-29 [https://perma.cc/GK4P-HML8].
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and . . . pre-agreed upon payout[s].”183 While parametric insurance has been
around as an idea since the 1990’s, the trustless design of smart contracts has
helped reduce the risk of fraud, and has helped make such insurance products
feasible.184 The development of sophisticated oracles allows parametric insurance to reliably consult outside sources for contingent conditions.185
NASDAQ estimates that “there are over $1 trillion dollars of uninsured
crops.”186 For farmers dependent on rainfall, climate change is expected to
add to the risk of farming.187 So far traditional insurance has not offered
coverage to small plots in developing countries.188 Insurtech, Arbol’s Parametric crop insurance, uses “smart contracts that execute based on oracledelivered weather data from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).”189 Small farmers reap the benefit of Arbol’s circumvention
of costly “legal systems and subjective insurance assessments.”190 Smart contract parametric insurance can even be used to reimburse a claimant whose
flight was delayed by forty-five minutes or more.191 So long as a passenger
holds a ticket for a flight, they can choose what level premium to pay, and
the platform conveniently returns the coverage for the flight.192
This form of insurance might be an excellent hedge against the dangers
of smart contracts. Nexus Mutual is hesitant to call itself insurance, but it
provides a similar service.193 Nexus Mutual “is a discretionary mutual: a mutual fund that provides discretionary cover, which is an insurance-like product that involves only a discretion, not a legal obligation, to pay out on the
occurrence of a material loss.”194 The automation of insurance claims
processing in simple situations that fit the if X then Y formula could drastically lower insurance costs.195 The lower costs these products can provide
might bring more smart contracts under the safety of insurance-like products.
183. Id.
184. See id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Zhou, supra note 182.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Etherisc, Flight Delay Insurance DApp Powered by Etherisc, YOUTUBE (Jul.
20, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LCRkFifVcIc [https://perma.cc/
9TLC-G8FE].
192. Id.
193. Understanding Nexus Mutual, NEXUS MUTUAL, https://nexusmutual.gitbook.io/
docs/users/understanding-nexus-mutual [https://perma.cc/EF9Z-5YEX].
194. Id.
195. See Kot, supra note 178.
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As a result, the increased use of insurance is likely to inspire consumer confidence in smart contracts and ultimately facilitate its adoption into the
mainstream.
All of the potential problems that smart contracts introduce to insurance
are short-term.196 By designating a trusted third party, like NOAA, to validate
an event, parties can still utilize the truth-seeking function of courts without
having to pay for its expertise.197 A judge might take judicial notice of an
earthquake.198 The automation of these questions allows for reliable data to
determine the outcome of a contract.199 If the parties agree to a fixed payout
based on the occurrence of an event to which a judge may take judicial notice, it would be wholly appropriate, markedly cheaper, and more efficient to
keep the contract out of the traditional legal system.200 Traditional insurance
transactions keep power with the issuing company.201 The company has the
power to employ an insurance adjuster to render a subjective opinion.202 In
parametric insurance, the power favors the claimant.203 A consumer could
negotiate with an insurance company about which trusted third party to connect to an oracle, or whether to aggregate a consensus among several trusted
third parties, or alternatively find a company that is willing to negotiate. If
those trusted third parties publish data that triggers the smart contract, the
money is immediately paid out to the claimant.204 The fight over the condition fulfillment of a smart contract takes place after its execution.205 That way
claimants who might rely on that money can get that money sooner without
having to wait for the legal system to analyze the facts.206

196. Id.
197. See generally Zhou, supra note 182.
198. See Wolfe v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 46 Cal. App. 4th 554, 560 (1996)
(“We must take judicial notice of the Northridge earthquake itself since that
occurrence is a fact of generalized knowledge so universally known that it cannot reasonably be the subject of dispute”).
199. See Oracles, supra note 157.
200. See Zhou, supra note 182.
201. See Parametric Disaster Insurance, NAIC (Feb. 24, 2022), https://content.naic.org/cipr-topics/parametric-disaster-insurance [https://perma.cc/C9Z74J48].
202. See id.
203. See generally id.
204. Claims Assessment, NEXUS MUTUAL, https://nexusmutual.gitbook.io/docs/
users/understanding-nexus-mutual/claims-assessment [https://perma.cc/5F4Q4T6J].
205. See Parametric Disaster Insurance, supra note 201.
206. See id.
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Smart contracts, like traditional contracts, offer benefits and
drawbacks.

These are only a few examples of how smart contracts are changing
traditional financial instruments today. Any transaction that can be reduced
to an “if X, then Y” statement is more efficient on the blockchain.207 Ultimately, the market will decide whether smart contracts and decentralization
are valuable.208 End users might not care about how parties execute contracts,
but end users do care that a product is faster, cheaper, and more secure.209
Thus, smart contracts are here to stay.
IV. THE LEGAL STATUS OF DECENTRALIZED
AUTONOMOUS ORGANIZATIONS IS UNKNOWN AND
UNPREDICTABLE
A Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) “is a software running on a blockchain that offers users a built-in model for the collective management of its code.”210 Simply put, DAOs are an organization of people
with rules for how those people interact and how the organization makes
decisions.211
One common way of thinking about DAOs is that owners collectively
manage “an internet-native business.”212 A lack of centralized leadership can
be a good or a bad thing.213 There is no CEO to authorize a budget or CFO to
cook the books.214 The amorphous nature of DAOs makes them difficult to
define as business entities.215

207. See Kot, supra note 178.
208. See Sam Klemens, Do People Really Care About Decentralization?, EXODUS
(Apr. 27, 2021), https://www.exodus.com/blog/do-people-really-care-about-decentralization/ [https://perma.cc/VW3M-GD6D].
209. See generally id.
210. What Is a DAO? (Decentralized Autonomous Organization), KRAKEN, https://
www.kraken.com/en-us/learn/what-is-decentralized-autonomous-organizationdao [https://perma.cc/2C2W-ETYG].
211. Id.
212. Decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs), ETHEREUM, https://ethereum.org/en/dao/ [https://perma.cc/2PFX-HJ9S].
213. See id.
214. Id.
215. See Robbie Morrison ET AL., The DAO Controversy: The Case For a New
Species of Corporate Governance?, FRONTIERS IN (May 27, 2020), https://
www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fbloc.2020.00025/full [https://perma.cc/
JZ33-FHC2].
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The most famous example of DAOs is the DAO.216 As previously mentioned, hackers exploited the DAO for $60 million U.S. dollars worth of
Ether.217 This theft resulted in Ethereum’s hard fork.218 In this DAO, “all
members were owners who functioned also as managers.”219 However, the
owners did not all share a vision for the organization.220 While the ethics of
the DAO’s hard fork are beyond the scope of this comment, the DAO raises
several important legal questions.221
Where someone is physically hurt because of a DAO’s actions, traditional business entities offer analogous case law.222 In that same vein, legal
service provider “OpenLaw provides the blockchain-based tools to create
‘limited liability wrappers’ for DAOs.”223 OpenLaw claims that it improves a
DAO’s settlement predictability both on and off the blockchain.224 And importantly, OpenLaw claims that it “provides an important corporate veil over
DAO business activities to remove the default, joint, and several liability”
ordinarily associated with general partnerships.225
A.

Wyoming and Vermont Are on the Forefront of Blockchain Law

Some states have proactively answered whether DAOs are a distinct
legal entity. Wyoming allows DAOs to form as a legal entity recognized by
the state.226 A DAO’s agent must select LLC from the Wyoming Secretary of
State and then select “Decentralized Autonomous Organization from the Additional Designation drop down menu.”227 No member of a limited liability
autonomous organization (LAO) must be a Wyoming Resident.228 But a LAO
216. See generally Cryptopedia Staff, supra note 40.
217. Id.
218. Morrison, supra note 215.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See id.
222. OpenLaw, The Era of Legally Compliant DAOs, MEDIUM (Jun. 26, 2019),
https://medium.com/@OpenLawOfficial/the-era-of-legally-compliant-daos491edf88fed0 [https://perma.cc/UD52-BNKE].
223. See generally id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. See Wyo. Sec. of State, Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO): Frequently Asked Questions, https://sos.wyo.gov/Business/Docs/DAOs_FAQs.pdf;
WYO. STAT. § 17-31-104(2021) (amended 2022).
227. Wyo. Sec. of State, supra note 226.
228. See WYO. STAT. § 17-28-101 through 111 (2019) (amended 2021).

288

SMU Science and Technology Law Review

[Vol. XXV

must designate a “registered agent” who resides at a “registered office” to
receive service of process.229
Wyoming has made several moves in recent years to encourage the development of cryptocurrency.230 The state exempted open blockchain tokens
from state securities laws.231 Effectively, Wyoming distinguishes between
utility tokens and non-utility tokens.232 The test is multifaceted and considers
several complicated factors.233 The move is mostly symbolic because the
SEC has refused to draw a bright-line rule exempting utility tokens.234 However, the law “provides a great deal of clarity for blockchain developers who
have thus far been operating in an information vacuum.”235 Earlier Wyoming
also exempted “virtual currency” from Wyoming’s Money Transmitter
Act.236
Wyoming’s blessing to the LAO corporate structure provides similar
clarity. The state allows an existing LLC to convert into a LAO.237 Further,
the state allows the LAO to statutorily declare whether it is a member managed LAO or an algorithmically managed LAO.238 Empirical data suggests
that regulations do not scare off investors.239 There is rarely a price decline
following a country’s cryptocurrency regulations.240
Vermont has taken a similarly proactive approach to nurture
blockchains.241 Vermont allows for “Blockchain-based Limited Liability
Companies” (BBLLC).242 BBLLCs “may provide for its governance, in
229. Id.
230. See Daniel Cohen et. al, Understanding the Effect of Wyoming’s Blockchain
and Cryptocurrency Legislation, JDSUPRA, https://www.jdsupra.com/post/contentViewerEmbed.aspx?fid=AA8f16b3-2717-4697-8c06-9e606f3c9ee8 [https:/
/perma.cc/JYP6-L9X4].
231. Id.
232. Matthew T. McClintock, Understanding Wyoming’s 2018 Blockchain Laws: A
Model for Industry Regulation, 41 WYO L. J. 40, 43 (2018).
233. Id.
234. Cohen, supra note 230.
235. McClintock, supra note 232.
236. Id.
237. WYO. STAT.17-31-104(b) (2021) (amended 2022).
238. WYO. STAT.17-31-104(e) (2021) (amended 2022).
239. Kevin Werbach, Why Regulation Won’t Harm Cryptocurrencies, UNIV. OF PA.
WHART. (Apr. 27, 2021), https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/whyregulation-wont-harm-cryptocurrencies/ [https://perma.cc/5CJP-ACYX].
240. Id.
241. See Catherine Martin Christopher, Error Correction Mechanisms for Transactional Script Smart Contracts, 69 U. KAN. L. REV. 493, 514 n.116 (2021).
242. See 11 V.S.A. § 4173 (2017).
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whole or in part, through blockchain technology.243 Additionally, Vermont
allows corporate recordkeeping through distributed ledger technology as admissible evidence in court.244
B.

States Ignore DAOs at Their Own Risk.

Regardless of how a state decides to treat DAOs in their business codes,
they must resolve the issue soon. One legal commentator has proposed “that
many state LLC statutes permit the development of zero-member LLCs governed exclusively by an operating agreement.”245 “This technique . . . allows
software systems to achieve a very close surrogate for legal personhood.”246
The technique has four steps: (1) a person (Founder) files to create a member-managed LLC in the state; (2) the LLC adopts an operating agreement
that says “the LLC will take actions as determined by an autonomous system;” (3) the Founder then transfers their interests in the autonomous system’s “physical apparatus” and intellectual property to the LLC; and finally
(4) the Founder leaves the LLC.247 In theory, this technique might work in
Wyoming’s LAO system because the LAO can self-select into the member
managed option.
Critics point out that “it is unlikely that a court considering [these statutes] would conclude” that the law allows for zero-member LLCs.248 But
states do not have the luxury of reacting to these issues.249 Hypothetically a
true artificial intelligence could solicit an unwitting agent to complete this
technique. The artificial intelligence could then go on to amass interests in
real estate, financial instruments, or even a private military. If there is no
clear rule to prevent this situation, an artificial intelligence may choose to
deliberately conceal its existence until it has amassed enough power to
achieve its goals. Such a scenario “is merely the culmination of decades of
increased power for operating agreements and decreased power for the membership of legal entities.”250
States that choose to embrace blockchain as the future of finance and
business entity law will reap massive benefits over those that do not. Kear243. Id. at (1).
244. 12 V.S.A. § 1913(b) (Westlaw Acts 77 through 81 of the Regular Session of
the 2021-2022 Vermont General Assembly (2022)).
245. Shawn Bayern, Are Autonomous Entities Possible?, 114 NW. U. L. REV. Online 23, 24 (2019).
246. Id.
247. Id. at 26–27.
248. Matthew U. Scherer, Of Wild Beasts and Digital Analogues: The Legal Status
of Autonomous Systems, 19 NEV. L. J. 259, 265 (2018).
249. See id.
250. Bayern, supra note 245.
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ney, Nebraska, known as “[t]he Sandhill Crane Capital of the World,”251 now
hosts many cryptocurrency miners ousted by China’s ban on mining.252 Migrating miners hold the United States in high regard because of improved
legal protections for business owners.253 But, “environmental concerns and
infrastructure bottlenecks in the [United States] have slowed the mining migration.”254 Thus, as countries around the globe make regulatory blunders
with blockchain technology, states that are set up to accept and support
blockchain operations will flourish with new revenue streams.255
C.

It Is Unclear What Kind of Fiduciary Duties Courts Will Impose
on Members of DAOs.

States could further provide regulatory clarity by deciding whether to
impose fiduciary duties on members of a DAO.256 Legal commentators have
proposed that Delaware fiduciary laws might solve the fifty-one percent attack issue.257 In a DAO, a fifty-one percent attack occurs where the “holder
of [fifty-one percent] of a DAO’s tokens could make and approve a proposal
to send all of the DAO’s funds to [themselves].”258 At the moment “it is
unclear whether . . . human decision-makers would be found to owe fiduciary
duties to a DAO and its investors.”259 This confusion extends to a DAO’s
coders or curators too. Must a DAO’s programmer “act in good faith, with
due care and in the best interests of the organization and token-holders when
writing” a DAO’s code?260
The running theme to these unanswered questions is that a state’s answer one way or another is more helpful than the murky waters of today’s
blockchain regulatory scheme. Empirically, “public companies have shown a
significant appetite” to contract around the traditional duty of loyalty in Dela251. Welcome to Kearney, VISIT KEARNEY, https://visitkearney.org/ [https://
perma.cc/SX3X-GYNZ].
252. John Ruwitch & Emily Feng, How the U.S. benefits when China turns its back
on Bitcoin, NPR (Feb. 24, 2022), https://www.npr.org/2022/02/24/
1081252187/bitcoin-cryptocurrency-china-us [https://perma.cc/4FYC-LEAD].
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. See id.
256. Matthew J. O’Toole et al., O’Toole, Kelly and Hahn on Why Delaware May Be
the Right Jurisdiction For “Smart” Orgs, POTTER ANDERSON CORROON (Feb.
16, 2018), https://www.potteranderson.com/newsroom-publications-OTooleKelly-and-Hahn-On-Why-Delaware-May-Be-The-Right-Jurisdiction-ForSmart-Orgs.html [https://perma.cc/YF8J-A6NY].
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
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ware and other states that allow for similar corporate opportunity waivers.261
This trend towards contractually changing fiduciary duties is further evidence
that our legal system is capable of extraordinary flexibility for blockchain
organizations.262 Blockchain businesses should push for recognition as official legal entities so that they may avail themselves of the benefits that society has bestowed upon traditional business.
The worst-case scenario would be where a DAO with massive capital
implodes overnight, and the courts treat that DAO as a general partnership.
Some legal commentators take the position that the DAO was merely “a general partnership.”263 Where a DAO aims to provide transparency as to the
allocation of risk in a business, a state’s silence as to a DAO’s legal status
might upend that transparency.264 Investors who thought they were participating in a safe DAO could be held jointly and severally liable for that DAO’s
actions.265 So long as states provide clear rules about how they will treat
DAOs, these entities can contract to create the optimal solution for their
investors.
V.

THE BLOCKCHAIN ALLOWS FOR UNIQUE NEW
FINANCIAL LENDING INSTRUMENTS.

The instantaneous quality of blockchains has allowed lending instruments to flourish in the cryptoeconomy.266 The International Monetary Fund
acknowledges that blockchains “have potential as a tool for faster and
cheaper cross-border payments.”267 The International Monetary Fund uses
the term cryptoization to refer traditional asset and currency substitution with
crypto solutions.268
Cryptocurrency staking is a way for investors to “stake” their holdings
to earn rewards over time.269 Staking cryptocurrency is like placing money in
261. Gabriel Rauterberg & Eric Talley, Contracting Out of The Fiduciary Duty of
Loyalty: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Opportunity Waivers, 117
COLUM. L. REV. 1075, 1147 (2017) [https://perma.cc/CSM3-VHZR].
262. See id.
263. Id. at 1536, 1554–55.
264. See id. at 1536.
265. Id. at 1535–36.
266. See Ryan Wangman, Crypto-backed Loans Don’t Require a Credit Check, but
Your Collateral Isn’t Immune to Market Swings, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 2, 2021),
https://www.businessinsider.com/personal-finance/what-is-crypto-lending
[https://perma.cc/G5KR-NGS4].
267. IMF, THE CRYPTO ECOSYSTEM
(2021).
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an interest-bearing account.270 While “[t]he national average interest rate for
savings accounts [as of March 2022] is 0.06 percent,”271 popular coins like
Ethereum, Cardano, and Polkadot can yield as high as five to twenty
percent.272
However, staking remains shrouded in unclear regulation.273 Weighing
heavy on the minds of every crypto investor is whether gains made through
staking are taxable.274 In 2019 Joshua Jarrett received rewards from staking
on the Tezos public blockchain.275 Jarrett argued to the IRS that those staking
rewards were not income and requested a refund.276 Jarrett filed a subsequent
complaint in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee for a refund.277 The complaint argues that tokens are only taxable at
sale, not when they accrue through a staking reward.278 The complaint cites
to “an established tax law principle that newly created property is not an
‘accession to wealth’ that is ‘clearly realized.’ ”279 The IRS offered Jarrett a
refund, but Jarrett declined “because the IRS did not provide a reason for the
refund and left open the issue of whether the creation of tokens through staking is a taxable event.”280
Investors like Jarrett are taking the fight to regulators in search of clarity.281 Rather than merely accepting the refund, Jarrett is fighting to ensure
that the either the IRS or the courts will deliver a rule.282 Regulators will not
270. Id.
271. Matthew Goldberg, What Is the Average Interest Rate for Savings Accounts?,
BANKRATE, https://www.bankrate.com/banking/savings/average-savings-interest-rates/#:~:text=the%20national%20average%20interest%20rate,2022%
20weekly%20survey%20of%20institutions [https://perma.cc/LUV8-JYEJ].
272. James Royal, Crypto Staking: What Is It and How Much Can You Earn in
Rewards?, BANKRATE (Feb. 24, 2022), https://www.bankrate.com/investing/
crypto-staking/ [https://perma.cc/UVC8-EYZ6].
273. Pallav Raghuvanshi & Shira Peleg, A Recent Court Case Leaves Many Speculating on the Taxation of Staking Rewards, 12 NAT’L L. REV. (2022) https://
www.natlawreview.com/article/recent-court-case-leaves-many-speculating-taxation-staking-rewards [https://perma.cc/NLE3-EPUZ].
274. Id.
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277. Tom Geraghty & Kali McGuire, The Jarretts Raise the Stakes, DLA PIPER
(Feb. 18, 2022), https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2022/02/
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have the luxury of sitting back and waiting for cryptocurrencies to develop so
that they can then draft policies.283
Not all players in the crypto space are willing to place their money on
the line for the sake of clarity. For example, BlockFi offered BlockFi Interest
Accounts (BIA), where investors stake cryptocurrencies, in exchange for a
variable interest rate paid out monthly.284 But in February, 2022, BlockFi
Lending agreed to pay a $100 million settlement to the SEC and thirty-two
states for offering unregistered securities.285 SEC Chair Gary Gensler said it
was “the first case of its kind with respect to crypto lending platforms.”286
The SEC’s move has prompted Coinbase to shutter its plans for a lending
product.287
Online lenders have also inherited the same evils present in traditionalpredatory lending operations.288 While the term Fintech used to signify something about a bank (or non-bank company) operation, now Fintech is a confusing term that predatory lenders can use to deceive consumers.289
Companies “operat[ing] online but have little other technological advancement still bill themselves as ‘fintechs.’ ”290 And now Fintech lumps together
firms that offer affordable interest rates with firms “that charge triple digit
rates and prey on the poor.”291
Aristotle labeled usury as “the most hated sort” of trade.292 The introduction of new technology like cryptology, which enables new forms of
283. See id.
284. Crypto Interest Rates, BLOCKFI, https://blockfi.com/rates/ [https://perma.cc/
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Failing to Register Loan Products, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2022), https://
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usury, does not fundamentally change the underlying evil of these transactions. And it does not help that the Federal Reserve’s interest rates are at
historic lows.293 Investors will always follow higher yields, and “[t]here is
now more than $200 billion in total value locked or deposited” in decentralized finance platforms.294 Regulators must not allow the blockchain to become the wild west of lending and allow predatory lenders to target the most
vulnerable consumers.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Cryptocurrency, like any technology, has potential for good and evil.
Smart contracts will improve the speed and cost of routine business transactions, but only if developers and law makers can agree on a proper risk allocation. The same is true for DAOs. DAOs will be a powerful tool for new
forms of corporate governance in the coming years, but only if law makers
can wrap their heads around this new design and provide clarity. Lending on
the blockchain has the opportunity to expand access for underserved communities, but it will also take advantage of those communities if regulators remain passive. Every technology on the blockchain has the power to
revolutionize these traditional financial transactions for people who have
consistently been excluded from these transactions before. As it stands now,
the federal legislature must take intelligent and coherent steps towards reigning in bad actors so that society may fully benefit from its adoption of this
new ledger technology.
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